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THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982:
DOES IMMIGRATION & NA TURALIZA TION
SERVICE v. CHADHA VETO THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has used the legislative veto as a procedural device for over
fifty years.1 The veto is a tool used to delegate broad powers through the
enactment of legislation while retaining an oversight or review function
over the exercise of such delegated power.2
In 1983, the Supreme Court held in Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha3 that the legislative veto in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA)a was unconstitutional. 5 It constituted legislative ac-
tivity; as such, it failed to satisfy the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of article I of the United States Constitution. 6
A multitude of different statutes contain legislative veto provisions. 7
The Chadha decision does not necessarily destroy their constitutionality
in all cases. Whether a given legislative veto will be held unconstitu-
tional under Chadha will depend upon the circumstances and procedures
under which it is exercised as enacted in the statute.8 A court will also
have to decide whether the Chadha decision should be retroactively ap-
plied to the challenged statute.9 If the legislative veto of a statute is found
unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute may be saved if the veto
can be severed from the rest of the statute.10
1. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983)(Vhite, J.,
dissenting).
2. See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
3. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
5. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
6. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
7. Legislative veto provisions are found in statutes dealing with reorganization, budgets, for-
eign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the environment and the economy.
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1003 app. (1983)(appendix to
opinion of White, J., dissenting) for a list of specific statutes in these areas.
8. See infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 116-157 and accompanying text.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)" was enacted in 1982 to
establish programs for the development of safe, permanent disposal re-
positories for high-level nuclear waste. 2 There is a legislative veto
within the NWPA whereby Congress may nullify a host state or Indian
tribe's disapproval of their land being recommended for a repository. 3
The question of whether Chadha would render this veto provision of the
NWPA unconstitutional has never been addressed. It can be argued that
Chadha does not apply because the Court in Chadha interpreted the con-
stitutionality of the veto in the context of delegated authority to the exec-
utive branch whereas the NWPA delegates authority to state government
and Indian tribes. 4
This Comment will discuss the legislative veto and its constitutional-
ity following the Chadha decision. The NWPA will then be examined to
determine whether its legislative veto provision would be constitutional
under Chadha, whether retroactive application of Chadha to the NWPA
would be appropriate, and if held unconstitutional, whether the veto pro-
vision may be severed from the rest of the NWPA to prevent the entire
NWPA's demise.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
A legislative veto is a provision in a statute which provides that a
particular delegated action will take effect only if Congress does not nul-
lify it"5 by resolution 6 within a specified period of time. 7 Veto provi-
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1982).
12. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201, 2201 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1982)).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1982). "If any notice of disapproval of a repository site designa-
tion has been submitted to the Congress... such site shall be disapproved unless ... the Congress
passes a resolution of repository siting approval .... " Id.
14. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) [hereinafter cited
as INA]. The INA establishes rules and regulations to regulate immigration. See id. §§ 1101-1503.
The statute gives the Attorney General the authority to suspend the deportation of an alien. See id.
1254(a)(1). But, § 1254(c)(2) provides that the decision of the Attorney General can be vetoed by a
resolution of one house of Congress. See id. § 1254(c)(2).
16. A resolution is the formal expression of the opinion or will of an official body adopted by a
vote. A resolution is distinguished from a law in that the former is used whenever the legislative
body passing it wishes to express an opinion as to something and is to have only a temporary effect
whereas the latter is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or
things in general. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (5th ed. 1979). A joint resolution requires
the approval of the President while a concurrent resolution does not. See id.
17. Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 785 (1984). Under the legis-
lative veto provision of the NWPA, Congress must pass a resolution nullifying disapproval of a
repository site "during the first period of 90 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress."
42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1982).
1986]
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sions differ in that they may require a resolution to be passed by one
house of Congress, by both houses of Congress, or by congressional com-
mittee."8 Typically, three characteristics are present in statutes contain-
ing legislative veto provisions:' 9 (1) a statutory delegation of power,
usually to the executive branch;20 (2) the exercise of that power by the
delegatee; 21 and (3) a reservation of authority by Congress to nullify that
exercise of power by the delegatee.22
Legislative veto provisions have become the most direct and effec-
tive guarantee that broad delegations of power will not siphon congres-
sional power.23 For this reason, legislative veto provisions frequently
appear in statutes which delegate broad powers to the regulatory agen-
cies of the executive branch.24 In essence, veto provisions serve as legis-
lative compromises in battles for delegated power in three general
situations.2 First, a veto may serve as a compromise between important
substantive conflicts within the Constitution.26 Second, a veto may serve
as a compromise of conflicts within Congress itself because of the scar-
city of legislative time.2v Third, a veto may serve as a compromise of
18. One commentator posits that legislative veto power (even in the form of one-house or two-
house vetoes) in reality centers in congressional subcommittees and can be a method for concentrat-
ing power in the hands of a few legislators, rather than a "grand democratic device for controlling
the bureaucracy." Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash? 56 N.C.L. REv. 423, 446 (1978).
19. Breyer, supra note 17, at 786.
20. See, eg., supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text and infra notes 21-28 and accompanying
text.
21. See, eg., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-24 & 924 n.1
(1983)(Attomey General delegated enforcement responsibilities of the INA; responsibility dis-
charged through the INS; INS held deportation hearing and suspended deportation of applicant).
22. Breyer, supra note 17, at 786.
23. In 1932, Congress enacted its first statute which contained a veto provision, the Act of June
30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414. This Act gave President Hoover the authority to reor-
ganize executive departments subject to a one-house veto. See id. §§ 403, 407, 47 Stat. at 413-14.
Since 1932, veto provisions have proliferated. Justice White, dissenting in Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Chadha, specifically listed in an appendix fifty-six statutes that now contain veto
provisions, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1003-13 (1983)(White, J., dissenting), while he estimated that
these devices have appeared in about two hundred laws enacted over the last fifty years. See id. at
968.
24. See, eg., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c)(l)-(2) (1982); Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1204, 1276, 2083 (1982); Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
25. Breyer, supra note 17, at 786.
26. The veto provision in the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982), reconciles
the potential conflict between the constitutional grant to Congress of the power to declare war, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, and the constitutional grant to the President of authority over the Armed
Forces as their Commander in Chief, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Under the War Powers Resolu-
tion, the President cannot maintain an armed conflict for longer than ninety days if both houses of
Congress enact a resolution of disapproval. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
27. See, eg., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 990-94
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conflict in the administrative state between the political accountability of
Congress and the inherent complexity of regulatory decision-making.28
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
Historically, presidential attitude toward the legislative veto has
been generally ambivalent.29 Congressional use of the legislative veto for
fifty years prior to Chadha is evidence of its constitutionality.30 There has
also been extensive commentary on the legislative veto, though largely
split as to its constitutionality. 31
It was not until 1980 that a legislative veto provision was held un-
constitutional.32 The Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty of the con-
stitutional status of the legislative veto when, in Chadha, it affirmed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court which held the veto provision of the
(1983)(White, J., dissenting)(reviewing history behind legislative veto provision of the INA). The
following immigration and deportation issues, dealt with in Chadha, exemplify this conflict. Tradi-
tionally an illegal alien, seeking to escape deportation on grounds of special hardship, had to ask
Congress for relief. See Breyer, supra note 17, at 787. Congress would then have to pass a private
bill on each of these highly individual matters. Id. Congress, due to scarcity of legislative time,
finally decided to change the matter to one of administrative discretion. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at
990-94 (White, J., dissenting). Yet, in granting the executive the authority to grant hardship excep-
tions under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1982), Congress compromised by retaining the right to veto
a deportation suspension it believed unwarranted. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 990-94.
28. See Breyer, supra note 17, at 787-88. Under the Constitution, Congress generally cannot
delegate any part of its legislative power unless limited by a prescribed standard. United States v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931)(citing Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U.S. 364, 384-85 (1907)). But, the complexity of regulatory problems makes
specific legislation practically and politically difficult. This complexity leads Congress to enact stat-
utes delegating broad powers to the regulatory agencies while using the legislative veto to protect its
political accountability. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission has the power to prevent busi-
ness practices that are "unfair," 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l)-(2) (1982); the Federal Communications Com-
mission simply acts to serve "public convenience, interest, or necessity," 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982); and
the Interstate Commerce Commission sets rates that are adequate to cover total operating expenses
plus a reasonable and economic profit on capital. See 49 U.S.C. § 10704 (1982).
29. See supra note 18. There has been executive criticism of the legislative veto in principle and
questions about its constitutionality. See Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1002-29 (1975). Many presidents, however, have
signed into law bills containing vetoes, have defended their constitutionality, and have even proposed
them. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 969-70 nn.4-5 (White, J., dissenting).
30. The Supreme Court has indicated that congressional judgments as to the constitutionality
of a statute are entitled to some weight. See, eg., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61 (1982) (congressional choice to vest broad jurisdiction in the bankruptcy
courts, after substantial consideration of the constitutional questions involved, was reason to respect
the congressional conclusion of constitutionality)(citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73
(1980)).
31. Justice White in his Chadha dissent cites the extensive commentary, both favorable and
unfavorable, to the legislative veto. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 976 n.12 (White, J., dissenting).
32. The first federal court to decide the question upheld the constitutionality of the legislative
veto before it. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978). The Ninth Circuit Court then held that the legislative veto provision of the INA was uncon-
stitutional in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
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INA unconstitutional.33
In Chadha the Court conceptualized the legislative veto as legisla-
tive activity. 4 As such, it had to meet the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment under article I of the United States Con-
stitution.35 Defining legislative activity as "action that [has] the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons...
all outside the Legislative Branch, '3 6 the Court found the legislative
character of the veto was "confirmed by the character of the congres-
sional action it supplant[ed]. ' 37
The Court reasoned that without the veto, either house or both act-
ing together, could not effectively require the Attorney General to deport
an alien once he had suspended deportation pursuant to his authority
under the INA unless they enacted legislation to that end, satisfying arti-
cle I requirements of the Constitution.38  This definition of legislative ac-
tivity seems to permit congressional invalidation of delegated action only
through a statute passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the
President. 39 The Chadha Court also rejected the idea that legislative ve-
toes might be exempt from the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments if construed as amendments or repeals of the original legislation,
since such actions also have to conform with article I.40
The Court pointed out that not all congressional actions have to
fulfill the article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 4 1 It
discussed at length the express exemptions to article I requirements and
emphasized: "These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justi-
fied .... [T]hey provide further support for the conclusion that congres-
33. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra note 105 for reference to a number of cases where
lower courts invalidated legislative vetoes pursuant to Chadha and the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed them.
34. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-57.
35. Id. These constitutional requirements are that "[e]very bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. This clause embodies both the
bicameral and presentment requirements. Bicameralism requires that both houses of Congress pass
a bill. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948. Presentment requires that all legislation passed by Congress be
presented to the President for his approval or veto. See id. at 946. In order for a statute to take
effect, it must comply with the requirements of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Id. at 951.
36. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 952-54.
39. For an informative discussion of the drawbacks inherent in retroactive responses like cor-
rective legislation once the executive has acted, see Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 464 (1977).
40. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954.
41. Id. at 955.
[Vol. 21:694
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sional authority is not to be implied .... "'
The effect of the holding in Chadha apparently did not escape the
majority's awareness. It quoted a portion of a commentator's article
which described the 295 veto provisions that had appeared in 196 differ-
ent statutes since 1932.4 3 Though the Court did not challenge Justice
White's assertion in his dissent, regarding the usefulness of the legislative
veto as a "political invention,"' it concluded that "the fact that a given
law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-
tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution."45
IV. RETROACTIVITY
Retroactivity is an extremely important issue in the wake of Chadha
because, at the time of the decision, there were literally hundreds of stat-
utes that (potentially) now could be challenged under the Chadha hold-
ing. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,46 the Supreme Court developed the
following three-part test for the determination of when a holding in a
civil case should be applied retroactively:47
(1) Does the decision establish a new rule of law, either by overrul-
ing clear past precedent upon which litigants may have relied or by de-
ciding a question of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed?48
(2) Will retroactive application of the new rule further or retard
the operation of the purpose and effect of the rule?4 9
42. Id. at 956.
There are four provisions in the Constitution by which one House may act alone with the
unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto:
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeach-
ments. [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 6];
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment
on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. [U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl.
6];
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove
Presidential appointments. [U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2]; [and]
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by
the President. [U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2].
Id. at 955.
43. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45 (quoting Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary
Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977)).
44. Id. at 945.
45. Id. at 944.
46. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
47. See id. at 106-08.
48. See id. at 106.
49. See id. at 107-08. The Supreme Court has indicated that the most important criterion for
1986]
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(3) Will application of the new rule produce substantial inequita-
ble results?5 °
In most situations, When analyzing whether to apply a change of law
retroactively, the Supreme Court makes a general determination of its
applicability to all relevant situations.5 1 But, a general determination of
whether to apply Chadha retroactively would require evaluating its im-
pact on approximately 200 legislative veto provisions.52
The Supreme Court was silent on the issue of retroactivity when it
rendered its decision in Chadha. In light of the Court's recognition of
the far-reaching effects of its holding,53 one court has interpreted this
silence as persuasive evidence that the Supreme Court desired retroactive
application of the Chadha decision. 4 But, it has been more common for
the Supreme Court to decide the retroactivity issue in a later case rather
than in the law-changing case itself.5 Therefore, the mere fact that the
Court did not specifically address the question of retroactive application
of the Chadha holding is not conclusive evidence that it should be ap-
plied retroactively.
Immediately following the Chadha decision, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a number of lower court cases which had invalidated
legislative vetoes pursuant to the Chadha holding. 6 In so doing, the
Court implicitly applied the holding retroactively.5 But, this summary
affirmation does not preclude the Court from later deciding against retro-
determining the retroactivity question is whether the history, purpose, and effect of the new rule
would be better served by prospective only or prospective and retroactive application. See Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
50. See Huson, 404 U.S. at 108.
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
52. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting). It has been suggested that the difficulty
involved in formulating a uniform rule for Chadha should yield to a case-by-case analysis. See
EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 595 F. Supp. 344, 350 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
53. See supra notes 43-45 & 105 and accompanying text.
54. See EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co. 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
55. See, ag., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971)(denying retroactive applica-
tion of Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969)); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 296 (1967)(denying retroactive application of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966)(deny-
ing retroactive application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964)). But cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
88 (1982)(Supreme Court decided the retroactivity question within the law-changing decision itself).
56. See infra note 105.
57. Lower federal courts that have addressed the issue of retroactive application of Chadha
have reached opposite results. Compare Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 966-68 (D.D.C. 1983)
(Chadha applied retrospectively to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (1982)) with EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 595 F. Supp. 344, 351 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(denied retroactive application of Chadha to the Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1982)).
[Vol. 21:694
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active application of Chada because, in the lower court cases, the issue of
retroactivity was not specifically addressed. 8
If the Court were to decide the retroactivity question regarding
Chadha, it would have to analyze the question in terms of the three-part
test announced in Huson.59 The Chadha decision did establish a new
rule of law, thus fulfilling the first prong of the Huson test;60 the Court
had not previously ruled on the constitutionality of the legislative veto.61
The Chadha Court clearly delineated the purposes of the rule it formu-
lated, thus the second prong of the Huson test can be determined.62 The
Court stressed that the article I process for enacting legislation serves
important purposes in maintaining the balance of powers and separation
of powers doctrines which underlie our system of government.63 Citing
its own prior decisions, and writings of the framers of the Constitution,
the Court in Chadha noted that the presentment clauses, in clauses two
58. See infra note 105; see, eg., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 n.5 (1975)(Supreme
Court's application of one of its law-changing decisions to other cases before it on direct review, with
no discussion of retroactivity principles, does not preclude it from later refusing retroactive applica-
tion of that law-changing decision).
59. See Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-08; see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (Huson
test set out in full).
60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. Even though a lower court had found the legislative veto constitutional, see Atkins v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1057-71 (Ct. CI. 1977), the Supreme Court has indicated that when it
invalidates the prevailing statutory norm, as it did in Chadha, the "new rule of law" requirement is
satisfied. See, eg., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1975); see also Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1968)(new principle of law announced when
there is "such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine so as to constitute an entirely new rule
which in effect replaced an older one"). But ef Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 967 (D.D.C.
1983) (Chadha not new rule of law because unconstitutionality of legislative veto "clearly foreshad-
owed" prior to decision).
62. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for the statement of the second prong of the
Huson test.
63. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59. Despite the fact that the separation of powers doctrine is a
cornerstone of our constitutional system, there is no clear statement or definition of this doctrine.
While Alexander Hamilton made reference to the "important and well-established maxim which
requires a separation between the different departments of power," THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 413
(A. Hamilton)(H. Lodge ed. 1895), there is no explicit textual reference to the separation of powers
doctrine in the Consititution itself. The closest thing to an explicit statement of separation of powers
in the Constitution is the allocation of powers among the three branches in three articles. See U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 1.
The balance of powers doctrine is equally as elusive. It may be viewed as a necessary corollary
to the separation of powers doctrine in that the latter, as illustrated by the separate powers given to
the three branches of the federal government, yields no clear delineation between the branches' func-
tions. See J. NO\VAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 1983).
Instead, a system of checks and balances between the three branches of government was established
to ensure the political independence of each branch and to prevent the accumulation of power in any
single branch. See id. This system of checks and balances comprises the balance of powers doctrine.
In Chadha, the Court stated that legislative activity must comply with article I to ensure that
the checks and balances envisioned by the Constitution are not eroded. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957-58.
8
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and three of article I, are to serve the following three purposes: (1) care-
fully circumscribe Congress' power and provide the President with the
power to defend his or her rights from invasion by Congress' power;
(2) provide the President with the power to "check" whatever propensity
Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered
measures; and (3) assure that a "national" perspective-the President,
representing the people-is a part of the legislative process. 64
The purpose of the presentment clauses are interdependent with the
purposes of the bicameralism requirements, which are to: (1) re-empha-
size the second purpose of the presentment clauses; namely, to encourage
that legislation be carefully and fully considered before passage; (2) re-
strain the legislature in order to avert the threat of despotism; and (3) en-
sure that neither larger nor smaller states impose their will on the
others.65
Retroactive application of the Chadha holding has to be analyzed in
terms of its potential inequitable effects on any involved parties. 66 Retro-
active application of the Chadha holding would constitute a profound
disruption of the existing statutory scheme in the United States, 67
whereas strictly prospective application of Chadha would further the
purpose and effect of its holding by ensuring future compliance with the
requirements of article I of the Constitution.68
V. THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) was enacted to
establish programs for the development of repositories for safe, perma-
nent disposal of high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel, and to provide
for the safe stabilization and long-term protection of sites for disposal of
low-level radioactive wastes.6 9 There is no mention in the statement of
purpose for the NWPA of congressional control or state participation. 70
But, within a house report pertaining to the NWPA, there is the follow-
64. See Chadha. 462 U.S. at 946-48.
65. See id. at 948-51. See supra note 63 for a discussion of these two doctrines.
66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. See Note, The Status of Statutes Containing Legislative Veto Provisions After Chadha-Does
the EEOC Have the Authority to Enforce the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employ.
ment Act?, 59 WASH. L. REv. 549, 561 (1984).
69. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, § Il1(b), 96 Stat. 2201, 2207
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (b) (1982)); see also H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3792, 3792 [hereinafter cited as NWPA, H.R, REP.
No. 491].
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b) (1982).
[Vol. 21:694
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ing language indicating legislative intent regarding federal and state roles
within the disposal program:
Scientific reviews.., repeatedly show that in principle the hazards of
nuclear waste disposal are small. In practice ... management of nu-
clear wastes has been inadequate to guarantee that the risks will be
small in fact. It is necessary, therefore, to provide close Congressional
control and public and state participation in the program to assure that
the political and programmatic errors of our past experience will not be
repeated. 71
The house report describes a "cooperative and concurrence role in
the Federal program for States and Indian tribes where repository sites
are studied or developed, including an opportunity for such governments
to veto development of such sites if they so desire."' 72  The report also
states that the host state or Indian tribe on whose territory a site is lo-
cated is considered the "primary governmental participant" in the repos-
itory program.73 This language implies an intent to permit vast state
participation, but the report provides that "[a] state or tribal rejection [of
a site selection] can only be overridden by a joint resolution of the Con-
gress." 74 Therefore, it appears from this house report that, although
71. NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 69, at 3796 (emphasis added).
[I]n the 1960's increasing environmental awareness and decreasing confidence in the Fed-
eral government resulted in growing public attention to the potential problems associated
with nuclear power. The Atomic Energy Commission, predecessor to the Department of
Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, reacted with a rush to develop a pilot
permanent high level waste disposal facility.
Id. at 3793. A potential site in Lyons, Kansas was rejected after an intense political attack on the
program. Subsequently, it was discovered that there were serious technical flaws in the site. See id.
Federal credibility in nuclear waste management practices was undermined by widely pub-
licized and massive leaks of radioactive liquids from [storage] tanks at the Federal Hanford
reservation. A release of 115,000 gallons of liquid from one Hanford tank in 1973 has been
said to have been a major factor in a successful public referendum in California prohibiting
the construction of new nuclear power plants in the state until a solution to the waste
disposal problem is demonstrated.
Increased pressure to resolve the problem sent the Federal nuclear establishment in
1976 - then the Department of Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) - looking for a [disposal] site in Michigan, where political uproar quickly
brought the program to defeat again, this time even before enough drilling could be accom-
plished to determine whether technical flaws in the site existed.
Id.
72. NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 69, at 3796; see also NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b)
(1982) (authorizes the governor and legislature of the state, or the governing body of an Indian tribe
within the state, in which the site is located to submit a notice of disapproval to Congress).
73. NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 69, at 3812.
74. Id. at 3813; see also infra note 77. In the chronology of procedural steps of the NWPA, the
joint resolution by Congress to override the disapproval of a state or Indian tribe is not presented to
the President for approval. The President's approval of the site comes earlier in the chronology,
after the Secretary of Energy recommends the site to the President. See NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10132(b)
(1982); see also NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 69, at 3797 (proposed repository develop-
ment program and the proposed schedule for implementation of the program; set out in chronologi-
cal table); Appendix, infra p. 717.
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Congress intended for the states and Indian tribes to have the power to
disapprove of a repository site, Congress would still retain ultimate con-
trol in the form of an override provision. 5
The central feature of the NWPA is its procedure for developing the
first permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste.7 6 The NWPA
provides a specific schedule for various steps in the procedure to prevent
any longer delays than are absolutely necessary.77
A. Relationship Between Chadha and the NWPA
Constitutional challenges to the legislative veto under Chadha and
its progeny have essentially arisen in situations where Congress has en-
acted a statute delegating authority to the executive branch of the federal
government.78 It does not appear that the use of a legislative veto within
a statute delegating authority to a state government, as in the NWPA
statute, has been the subject of a constitutional challenge.7 9 One might
argue that Chadha only applies within the context of delegations of
power among the three branches of the federal government; however, the
broadness of the holding in Chadha in effect destroys the validity of this
argument." In fact, Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Chadha
expressed the opinion that the Court by its broad reasoning had invali-
dated all legislative veto provisions.81 Both Justice Powell and Justice
White believed that the Court's decision should have been based upon
the separation of powers theory, a narrower basis.82
75. See NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1982). This "override provision" of the NWPA is essen-
tially a two-house legislative veto provision.
76. See id. §§ 10132-10138.
77. See NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 69, at 3797 (chronology of NWPA's proce-
dural steps). The chronological table is reprinted in Appendix, infra p. 717.
78. See supra note 33.
79. This author has not located one case regarding the constitutionality of the legislative veto
either prior to or following Chadha where the challenged statutory provision was related to a delega-
tion of power to a state. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 987
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) for a discussion of constitutional delegations to private individuals.
80. In constitutional law, a federalism issue is one in which there is a conflict between power of
the federal government and power of a state government. See BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 551 (5th
ed. 1979); see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974-79 (White, J.,
dissenting) (Court's determination to invalidate all legislative vetoes). There is considerable contro-
versy as to whether Chadha would apply to unexercised veto provisions. Compare Muller Optical
Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1984) (unexercised veto in Reorganization Act of 1977
does not represent an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power) with EEOC v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 743 F.2d 969, 971 (2nd Cir. 1984) (unexercised veto in Reorganization Act of 1977
unconstitutional).
81. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White agreed that the Court
"sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions." Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Powell, the legislative veto of the INA was
nonlegislative and constituted a judicial act, thereby violating separation
of powers principles.83 Once this constitutional violation was discovered,
Justice Powell argued that there was then no need to reach the broader
question of whether legislative vetoes unconstitutionally violate the pre-
sentment clauses.84
The majority of the Court, however, found the legislative veto un-
constitutional on the broader ground of article I requirements. It relied
on strict construction of the Constitution,8 6 and as such, any veto provi-
sion which fails to satisfy article I requirements would be unconstitu-
tional on its face.87 The broad nature of the Chadha holding indicates
that it would likely be applicable to the legislative veto provision of the
NWPA.88
Under Chadha, a legislative veto provision has to conform to the
requirements under article I of the Constitution to be valid-it has to be
passed by both houses of Congress and be presented to the President for
his approval or disapproval.8 9 The language of subsection 10135(c) of the
NWPA-its veto provision-is vague: "Congress passes a resolution of
repository siting approval in accordance with this subsection approving
such site, and such resolution thereafter becomes law." 90
83. Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring). The characterization of any congressional action as
nonlegislative indicates a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 964-66 (Powell, J.,
concurring). This doctrine may be violated in two ways: (1) One branch of government may inter-
fere impermissibly with the performance of another branch's duties, or (2) one branch of government
may assume a function that is more properly entrusted to another branch. See id. at 963 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
For an analysis of legislative vetoes as being consonant with separation of powers principles as
well as due process concerns, see Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsid-
ered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 715 (1984).
84. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring). But cf id. at 946 (bicameral and present-
ment clauses "are integral parts of the constitutional design for separation of powers").
The distinction that Justice Powell makes between a narrow holding based on separation of
powers theory, on the one hand, and a broad holding based on the legislative veto and the require-
ments of article I, on the other hand, becomes somewhat confusing due to the majority opinion's
extensive discussion of separation of powers principles. See id. at 944-54. One commentator has
pointed out that the holding in Chadha is confusing and erroneous because the Court concentrated
on the effects of an exercise of the power created by the veto rather than focusing on the nature of the
power itself. See Comment, Characterization of the Legislative Veto: Courts Should Focus on the
Power Itself, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 927, 928 (1984).
85. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 105-106.
87. See Chadha, 464 U.S. at 974-77 (White, J., dissenting).
88. See NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1982).
89. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
90. NWPA, 42 U.S.C. §10135(c) (1982)(emphasis added).
The bicameralism requirements of article I are met because the legislative veto provision in the
NWPA is a two-house veto. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The legislative veto provision declared
1986]
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There are three possible ways to determine whether the legislative
veto provision of the NWPA meets the presentment requirements of arti-
cle 1.91 First, the lack of express presentment language in subsection
10135(c) fails to meet article I requirements and is therefore unconstitu-
tional under Chadha.92 Second, the language in subsection 10135(c)-
"such resolution thereafter becomes law"-constitutes an implied pre-
sentment satisfying article I requirements and is therefore constitutional
under Chadha. 93 Third, there is a constructive presentment built into the
procedural scheme of the statute because the President must approve the
site prior to Congress' approval. 9
4
It is not clear under Chadha or the Constitution itself whether the
bicameralism and presentment requirements for valid legislation have to
occur in a specific order, namely bicameralism and then presentment.
From the strict constructionalist view, the actual language of article I
seems to imply a particular order.9" Yet, that same language would also
seem to require that every bill first be passed by the House of Representa-
tives and then by the Senate. Such a literal construction would be erro-
neous. 96 Justice White implied in his dissent in Chadha that the order of
the language of article I was not the central concern of the presentment
and bicameralism requirements-what was important was to satisfy the
purposes of the article I requirements: "The central concern ... is that
when a departure from the legal status quo is undertaken, it is done with
the approval of the President and both Houses of Congress ... ."97 Ac-
unconstitutional in Chadha is a one-house veto which failed to meet the bicameralism requirement
under article I. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-59.
91. These constitutional requirements are that "[e]very bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. This clause embodies both the bicameral and
presentment requirements. Bicameralism requires that both houses of Congress pass a bill. See
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948. Presentment requires that all legislation passed by Congress be presented
to the President for his approval or veto. Id. at 946. For a statute to take effect, it must comply with
the requirements of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Id. at 951.
92. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
93. See id. The Court's opinion in Chadha does not expressly discuss the possibility of satisfy-
ing article I, section 7 requirements by implication; however, the author of this Comment believes
this manner of satisfaction logically follows from the opinion.
94. See NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(2)(A) (1982). But, the "constructive presentment" argu-
ment probably would not be upheld under the requirements found necessary in Chadha because such
reasoning could be used with any executive proposal for legislation.
95. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States ....").
96. Constitutional construction requires that language be given a reasonable construction so as
to avoid absurd consequences. See C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 14 (1982). Lit-
eral interpretation of language is improper if it yields unacceptable conclusions. See id. at 16.
97. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 994 (white, J., dissenting).
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cording to Justice White, the Attorney General's action-recommending
suspension of the deportation order-is deemed to be presidential or ex-
ecutive approval;98 and, the approval of both houses is found in the fail-
ure of both houses to pass a resolution of disapproval within the
statutory period.99
Using Justice White's reasoning, there is a stronger case for finding
that the legislative veto provision of the NWPA satisfies the concerns of
article I requirements. The repository site's original approval begins
with the President, "° followed by his recommendation of the site to Con-
gress.' 01 The site then becomes effective unless a petition of disapproval
is filed by the host state or Indian tribe.' If a petition of disapproval is
filed, then Congress can override the petition of disapproval by joint reso-
lution within the specfied statutory period.10 3 Congress is essentially
reapproving what has already been approved by the President and both
houses of Congress, thereby fulfilling both bicameralism and presentment
requirements under article I. °4
A strict reading of Chadha, however, would lead to a holding de-
claring the legislative veto provision of the NWPA unconstitutional as
failing to meet the presentment requirements of article I. The broad
scope of the Chadha holding'015 and its emphasis on strict construction of
98. Id.
99. See id. at 994-95.
100. See NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10134(2)(A) (1982).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 10135(b).
103. Id. § 10135(c).
104. See supra note 35.
105. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-105 (quoting commentary on the 295 veto provisions that had
appeared in 196 different statutes since 1932); see also notes 43-45 and accompanying text. This
acknowledgement by the Court is indicative of the Court's desire to invalidate, generally, the legisla-
tive veto. On July, 6, 1983, the Court refused to hear the following cases involving the legislative
veto which had been pending on its docket: Process Gas Consumers Group v. CECA, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Interstate Nat'l Gas Ass'n v. CECA, 673 F.2d
425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Petrochemical Energy Group v. CECA, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aft'd mer., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); American Gas Ass'n v. CECA, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mere., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United States Senate v. CECA, 673
F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United States House of Representa-
tives v. CECA, 673 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United States
Senate v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United States
House of Representatives v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aft'd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
The Court was able to reaffirm its decision in Chadha by summarily disposing of these other legisla-
tive veto cases. Justice White, along with Justice Rehnquist, had voted to hear the cases. In a short
dissent, Justice White states that the Court's action in refusing to hear the cases illustrated the
"constitutional myopia" of the earlier holding in Chadha. Process Gas, 463 U.S. at 1217-18 (White,
J., dissenting).
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article 1116 would necessitate the President's overriding the petition of
disapproval by the host state or Indian tribe. 10 7
B. Retroactive Application of Chadha to the NWPA?
Currently, the Supreme Court has not announced any definitive de-
cision regarding the retroactive application of the holding in Chadha. In
addition, the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroactive ap-
plication of Supreme Court decisions. 1 S Therefore, any court faced with
a challenge to a legislative veto provision under Chadha will have to de-
cide the retroactivity issue on the basis of the facts of the case before it
and the relevant statute being challenged. The NWPA contains a legisla-
tive veto provision; thus, it will probably be subject to such a challenge.
The following discussion will analyze the NWPA separately, determining
whether its veto provision will be subject to retroactive application of the
holding in Chadha.
The Supreme Court test for retroactive application formulated in
Huson, 109 when applied to the issue of the applicability of Chadha to the
NWPA, should yield a denial of retroactive application. In rendering its
decision in Chadha, the Court emphasized the purposes of the bicamera-
lism and presentment requirements of the Constitution.' 10 It stressed the
importance of maintaining the balance of power and separation of power
doctrines underlying our system of government.111
The power struggle in Chadha clearly involved two branches of the
federal government - the legislative branch and the executive branch. It
was reasonable to suspect that the legislative veto, and the way it would
operate under the INA, would possibly have an adverse effect on the
purposes the article I requirements were designed to ensure. But, analyz-
ing the NWPA, the effect of the legislative veto in it would not negate
106. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-54. The Court stated: "Explicit and unambigious provisions
of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive
in the legislative process .... [T]he precise terms... are critical to the resolution of this case." Id.
at 945 (emphasis added).
107. Even though both houses of Congress and the President have approved the site, the proce-
dures contained within the veto provision must meet article I requirements. "Amendment and re-
peal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with [article] I." Id. at 954. "Disagreement
with the Attorney General's decision [in Chadha] no less than Congress' original choice to delegate
to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that
Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the Presi-
dent." Id. at 954-55.
108. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
109. 404 U.S. at 106-08 (1971); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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any of the article I purposes. Both houses of Congress and the President
play a large role throughout the whole process of developing repository
sites. I 2 Therefore, under the second prong of the retroactivity test,1 1
3
arguably retroactive application of the Chadha holding to the NWPA
would not further the purpose and effect of the Court's decision.
Under the third prong of the retroactivity test,114 the retroactive ap-
plication of Chadha to the NWPA could produce substantial inequitable
results. If the legislative veto provision of the NWPA were held to be
unconstitutional, and if it were possible to sever it from the rest of the
Act, 1 5 it is unlikely that Congress would leave the Act intact without the
veto provision. Severed, the NWPA would provide the host state or In-
dian tribe with the absolute power to disapprove of a possible repository
site. Through either repeal or amendment, Congress would probably de-
crease or withdraw this power in the site selection process. If the NWPA
were to be left as is, i.e., with the legislative veto provision, at least the
states would play a role in the selection process. They would have the
opportunity to disapprove of a recommended site, and perhaps could ef-
fectively, with legitimate justifications for disapproval, eliminate their
own boundaries as a choice for a disposal site.
C. Severability of the Legislative Veto of the NWPA?
Once a court has ruled that a statutory provision is unconstitutional,
it must address the issue of severability to determine whether the remain-
der of the statute is valid without the unconstitutional provision. 116 If an
unconstitutional statutory provision is severable, the remainder of the
statute is valid without the unconstitutional provision.117 But, if the pro-
vision is not severable, the entire statute must be declared
unconstitutional.118
The traditional test for severability was formulated in 1902. In Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 119 the Supreme Court stated:
If different sections of a statute are independent of each other, that
which is unconstitutional may be disregarded, and valid sections may
112. See supra note 95-104 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 161-167 and accompanying text.
116. See generally Smith & Struve, Aftershock of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A.J.
1258 (1983) (discussion of the severability of legislative veto provision).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 184 U.S. 540 (1902), overruled on other grounds, Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
1986]
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stand and be enforced. But if an obnoxious section is of such import
that the other sections without it would cause results not contemplated
or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held
inoperative.120
This traditional inquiry focused on two issues: (1) Would the remainder
of the statute, once the unconstitutional portions were excised, be "fully
operative as a law"?121 and (2) Would the legislature have enacted the
constitutional provisions of the statute without the unconstitutional
provisions? 122
The Supreme Court has consistently declared that the determination
of legislative intent regarding the unconstitutional provision of a statute
should be the key test in determining severability.1 23 The difficulty of
this "elusive inquiry"124 into legislative intent has in some cases yielded
to the Court's reliance on the presence or absence of a "severability
clause"12 1 in the statute to determine whether a given unconstitutional
provision is severable. 126 But, the Court's attitude towards the signifi-
cance of severability clauses can only be described as ambivalent. In
some cases, the Court has almost entirely relied on a presumption re-
garding severability clauses- i.e., presence of a severability clause cre-
ated a presumption of severability while the absence of a clause created a
presumption that the provision in question was not severable.12 7 In other
120. Connolly, 184 U.S. at 565.
121. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
122. Id. at 234-35.
123. See, eg., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)(legislative intent is the key test in deter-
mining severability); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936)(legislative intent should be
governing factor to determine severability).
124. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
125. An example of a severability clause is found in section 10102 of the NGPA, where it is
provided that:
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter, or the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected thereby.
NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10102 (1982).
126. See, eg., Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938). In deciding on the
severability of a provision of the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1982), the
Court held that the test applied to determine severability must perform two functions: (1) examine
whether the unconstitutional provision and the remainder of the statute are so interwoven with each
other that their separation would be inherently difficult, and (2) examine the statute to see if it
contains a severability clause. See Electric Bond, 303 U.S. at 434-35. The Court, in Electric Bond,
stated that there is a presumption against severability if there is no severability clause. See id.
127. See Immigration & Naturalzation Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932, (1983) ("elusive
inquiry" into legislative intent need not be carried out because the severability clause in the INA was
Congress' answer to the severability question); see also Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S.
419, 434-35 (1938)(presumption against severability if statute does not contain severability clause);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241 (1929) ("In the absence of such a legislative declara-
tion, the presumption is that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety.").
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cases the Court has retreated from the presumption approach.12 8 One
commentator has suggested that the proliferation of severability clauses
should dissuade the courts from considering the presence of one to be
dispositive of the severability issue because the clause may be "mere
boiler plate" 12 9 and thus an unreliable indicator of legislative intent.13
In Chadha, the Supreme Court applied a multifaceted test13 1 for sev-
erability and held that the legislative veto provision of the INA was sev-
erable and therefore the rest of the Act was valid. 3 2 Applying the first
part of the test, the Court cited the presence of a severability clause 133 in
the INA and found that the "language [was] unambiguous and [gave]
rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act
as a whole . . . to depend upon whether the veto clause . . . was
invalid."''l3
As its second focus for the test, the Court looked at the legislative
history of the Act in an attempt to determine legislative intent. It found
the history of the Act was consistent with an interpretation favoring sev-
erability. 135  The Court contradicted itself, however, by stating that its
presumption of severability was supported by the history and then con-
cluding that the history regarding congressional reluctance to delegate
final authority to the Attorney General was insufficient to rebut this pre-
sumption created by the presence of the severability clause. 36
128. See CECA v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Court called the question of
presumptions "mostly irrelevant"), aftrd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); see also United States v. Jack-
son, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)("ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the
presence or absence of such a (severability] clause"); Dorchy v. Kansas 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924)
(severability clause provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid "but [it will not] be an
inexorable command").
129. Stem, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76,
79-81 (1937).
130. Id.
131. The Court applied a three-part test for determining whether the legislative veto provision of
the INA was severable:
(1) presence of a severability clause leads to a presumption in favor of severability;
(2) assess legislative history of the statute to derive legislative intent regarding severabil-
ity; and
(3) whether the statute, absent the veto provision, is "fully operative as a law," including
inquiry into whether the statute is a "workable administrative mechanism."
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35.
132. Id. at 959.
133. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 406, 66 Stat. 166, 281, cited
in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
134. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
135. See id.
136. See id. This is indicative of the great weight the Court gave to the presence of the severabil-
ity clause. But, it also underscores the difficulty of determining legislative intent regarding a legisla-
tive veto provision from the legislative history. Generally, testimony relates to the substantive issues
of a statute, thus the veto provision is rarely a subject for debate. For a general dicussion of the
1986]
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The third part of the test was whether the statute, absent the veto
provision, would be "fully operative as a law";137 i.e., whether the re-
mainder of the statute, absent the excised portion, would be a workable
administrative mechanism. 138 The Attorney General's authority to sus-
pend an alien's deportation is entirely independent of the veto provi-
sion. 13 9 Even without the veto provision, congressional supervision is
preserved because all suspensions of deportation must be reported to
Congress. 140 Therefore, Congress can still enact a law in accordance with
article I requirements mandating an alien's deportation;141 if not, depor-
tation proceedings are cancelled pursuant to the Act.1 42 Because the del-
egated power may be fully exercised without the veto provision while
Congress still retains some oversight power, the Court found the INA to
be "fully operative as a law" without the legislative veto provision.' 43
One dissenting opinion in Chadha, 144 quoting from an earlier case,
argued strongly against the severability of the legislative veto provision:
"[T]he excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and
there can be no doubt that the legislature intended that the meaning of
the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly."1 4  This
dissenting opinion in Chadha argued that the veto provision should be
seen as an exception to the general delegation of authority to the Attor-
ney General to suspend deportation proceedings unless Congress sees the
suspension as inappropriate:1 46 "[B]y rejecting the exceptions intended
by the legislature ... the statute is made to enact what confesseqly the
legislature never meant."147 This can result in the broadening or exten-
sion of the scope of the statute in ways contrary to legislative intent. 148
problems of applying general rules of severability to legislative veto provisions see Note, Severing the
Legislative Veto Provision: The Aftermath of Chadha, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 174, 184-91 (1984).
137. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934 (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,
234 (1932)).
138. See id. The Court did not examine the constitutionality of the surviving portions of the
statute. See id. at 934-35.
139. See id. at 934-35.
140. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982).
141. See id.
142. Id. § 1254(c)(2); cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941)("report and wait"
provision approved whereby Congress was given the opportunity to review newly promulgated Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure before they became effective and pass legislation barring their effective-
ness if found objectionable), noted in Chadha 462 U.S. at 935 n.9.
143. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934-35.
144. Id. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist & White, JJ., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1015 (citing Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1922)).
146. See id. at 1014.
147. Id. at 1014 (citing Spraique v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90, 95 (1886)).
148. The legislative veto may be seen as a proviso to the rest of the statute. "A proviso is a
clause engrafted on an enactment to restrain or modify the enacting clause or to except from its
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This reasoning could lead one to conclude that all legislative veto provi-
sions are prima facie inseverable. 149
Traditional severability analysis is anything but consistent. Perhaps
this is a legitimate attempt by the courts to keep the test flexible enough
to take into account the complexity and individuality of the statutes that
have been challenged. Certainly, after Chadha, in the case of the legisla-
tive veto provisions, application of rigid rules of severability could dis-
mantle a large portion of the administrative law system. 5 °
The administrative bureaucracy has not been dismantled following
Chadha because most courts have found the veto provision severable
from the remaining statute.15' Determining whether a statute can func-
tion once severed requires examination of the practical consequences of,
for example, the invalidation of the entire statue.' 52 A determination of
operation something which otherwise would have been within it." Note, Severing the Legislative Veto
Provision: The Aftermath of Chadha, 21 CALIF. W.L. REV. 174, 186 (1984). The Supreme Court
has found that the mere presence of a proviso in a statute is indicative of the legislature's intent to
restrict the scope of the statute. See, eg., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 525-26
(1929). If the legislative veto provision is seen as a proviso, any attempts to sever it from the rest of
the statute could be seen as contrary to legislative intent.
149. This position was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a
case challenging the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978. The court stated:
We decline to adopt this as a general principle that would make all veto provisions prima
facie inseverable. We think this statement does no more than restate the basic test that a
court should determine whether the provision was so essential to the legislative purpose
that the statute would not have been enacted without it.
CECA v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 445 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(construing NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (c)
(1982)), affd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
The Fourth Circuit Court, however, used this reasoning and found the legislative veto provision
of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 inseverable from the rest of that Act. The court reasoned that
Congress would not have empowered the President to raise salaries without reserving to itself the
power to veto increases. See McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1262 (4th Cir. 1977)(con-
struing provision of Fed. Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1982)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978)). After concluding that the veto provision was inseverable, the court avoided the constitu-
tional challenge to the veto by resorting to the doctrine of standing. See id. at 1262-63. The use of
standing as a substitute for severability had its origin in early cases in which litigants affected by
certain statutes challenged the constitutionality of particular provisions that did not affect them
directly, in the hope that the entire law would be struck. See Note, Severability of Legislative Veto
Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1182, 1189 (1984). The Supreme Court would
frequently respond by finding that the challenged provisions were severable or were unrelated to the
litigation. Litigants would not be able to obtain relief if those provisions were invalidated; conse-
quently, they would lack standing to challenge those sections. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923).
150. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-68 (White, J., dissenting).
151. See, e.g., Consumer's Union of the United States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(en
banc) (per curiam)(striking the legislative veto provision of the FTC Improvement Act of 1980 but
leaving intact the remainder of the Act), aft'd mem, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); CECA v. FERC, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(striking the legislative veto provision of the NGPA of 1978 but leaving
intact the rest of the Act), affid mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
152. See Note, supra note 149, at 1194.
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legislative intent necessarily involves the legislature's evaluation of the
feasibility and usefulness of the entire statute. 5 ' A legislative veto
should be analyzed from the standpoint of the entire statute's purposes
and policies;' 54 the veto should be found inseverable, thereby invalidating
the entire statute, only when severing the veto would defeat the statute's
"6essential purpose."15 The veto represents a control mechanism and not
a substantive purpose of the statute.'5 6 If Congress decides the statute
should not survive without the legislative veto, it is free to repeal or
amend the statute. 157
If Chadha were retroactively applied to the NWPA 5 8 and the legis-
lative veto provision 159 were held to be unconstitutional,' 160 a court
would have to determine whether the veto could be severed from the rest
of the Act. Under the test used in Chadha, 161 the legislative veto provi-
sion of the NWPA would be held severable. The first factor pursuant to
the test set forth in the Chadha decision is that the NWPA contains a
"separability clause."' 162 This can be construed as a presumption in favor
of severablity as the Court construed the severability clause of the
INA.' 63 The second factor is that, although the legislative history seems
to imply the importance of ultimate congressional control over the devel-
opment and implementation of the high-level nuclear waste disposal pro-
gram,' 64 merely rebutting the presumption created by the separability
clause is probably insufficient.
The third factor is that the NWPA would probably be seen as "fully
operative as a law."' 65 The authority of the state or Indian tribe to file a
petition of disapproval of a repository site is independent of the legisla-
tive veto provision. Congress would still have the specified statutory pe-
riod within which it could enact a law in accordance with article I
requirements that would approve of the recommended site. Absent such
an enactment, the petition of disapproval would become effective once
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 47-68 and 108-15 and accompanying text.
159. NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1982).
160. See supra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
162. NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10102 (1982); see also supra note 125 (section 10102 set out in full).
163. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
-165. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
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the statutory period had expired. Therefore, as was the case in
Chadha, 166 the NWPA may be "fully operative as a law" without the
legislative veto.
One argument against severability under the Chadha test is that,
even though the NWPA may literally remain "fully operative as a law"
without the veto provision, its utility as a "workable administrative
mechanism" may be seriously undermined. Assuming that the host state
or Indian tribe would still have the power to disapprove of recommended
repository sites once the veto had been excised, the probability that any
site selected would face a petition of disapproval from its host is great.
This possible deluge of petitions might delay or permanently stymie the
program from ever being implemented, effectively emasculating the en-
tire statute.
If the "exception to the general rule" test voiced by the dissent in
Chadha'67 were to be applied to the veto provision of the NWPA, it
would probably not be severable because it was present in the statute at
enactment and it obviously serves as a restraint on the power delegated
to the states. It is highly unlikely that Congress ever would have enacted
the Act without the veto provision, given the power of disapproval of site
selection that would be left to the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of the legislative veto provision as an efficient means of
government delegation of power is not necessarily darkened by the
Chadha decision. The Court's use of flexible and responsible decision-
making strategies in determining retroactive application of the Chadha
decision and severability questions regarding unconstitutional veto provi-
sions can yield results that are consistent with the spirit of the Constitu-
tion and responsive to the needs of a complex and technical
governmental system.
If the legislative veto provision of the NWPA were challenged on
constitutional grounds under Chadha, it would most likely survive. Its
main ground of defense centers on a retroactivity argument. Under the
Huson test for retroactive application of a new law, the Court would
probably deny retroactive application of Chadha to the NWPA because
retroactive application would not further the purpose and effect of the
Chadha holding; it might produce substantial undesirable results.
166. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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If Chadha were retroactively applied to the NWPA, the legislative
veto provision would probably be held unconstitutional for its failure to
satisfy the presentment requirements of article I of the Constitution.
But, because of the inconsistencies in the various severability tests being
utilized by the courts, it is difficult to determine whether the veto provi-
sion would be found to be severable. One point that seems clear, how-
ever, is that it is hard to imagine that Congress ever would have passed
the NWPA without reserving the ultimate control over high-level nu-
clear waste management and disposal.
Pamela Goldberg
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APPENDIX*
Chronology
180 Days After Date of Enact-
ment.
Not Later than
of Enactment.
1 Year After Date
Not Later than February 1, 1985.
Not Later than 60 Days After the
Secretary's Recommendations.
After President Approves a Site
for Study.
After Secretary Submits Environ-
ment Assessment to States and
Indian Tribes.
After Completion of Site Charac-
terization, public hearings and an
EIS.
No Sooner than 30 Days after
Notification of States by Secretary
of Energy of His Decision to
Recommend a Site to President.
Secretary of Energy issues guide-
lines for recommendation of sites
proposed to be studied indepth for
possible licensing as repositories.
Secretary of Energy recommends
to President at least 3 sites in not
less than 3 geologic media to be
studied for possible development
and notifies States and Indian
tribes of the recommendation.
Secretary recommends at least 2
additional sites to President for
study.
President approves or disapproves
sites for study and notifies States
and Indian tribes of his decision.
Secretary of Energy holds public
hearings near each site and submits
environmental assessment to States
or Indian tribes.
Secretary of Energy sinks study
shafts at each site and carries out
other site characterization activi-
ties.
Secretary of Energy notifies States
and Indian tribes of his decision to
recommend to President approval
of at least one site for licensing and
development as a repository.
Secretary of Energy may recom-
mend the site to the President for
approval for licensing and develop-
ment.
* Reprinted from NWPA, H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3792, 3797.
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Not Later than March 30, 1987,
but not before Secretary of
Energy Recommends a Site for
Approval as a Repository.
If Congress Approves the
Site .....
If A State or An Indian Tribe
Submits to Congress a Petition for
Disapproval.
If Congress Does Not Override a
State or Tribal Disapproval.
When A Site Designation has
become Effective (i.e., has not
been Disapproved).
Not Later than January 1, 1989
or the Expiration of 3 years After
the Submission of the License
Application (whichever is later).
Around 1995 ...................
President submits to Congress the
recommendation of a site qualified
for application for licensing as a
repository.
The designation of a site as suitable
for license application is effective if
a petition for disapproval is not
submitted to Congress by a State or
Indian tribe, or if Congress acts to
override a State or Tribal disap-
proval.
Congress has 90 calendar days to
pass a joint resolution overriding
the petition of disapproval under
expedited procedures.
President shall submit to Congress
another site recommendation
within 1 year of the disapproval.
Within 90 days the Secretary of
Energy shall submit to NRC a
license application for development
of the site.
NRC shall approve or disapprove a
construction authorization for con-
struction of a repository at the site.
Operation of the first national high
level nuclear waste repository.
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